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Abstract: Myanmar has experienced profound transformations of land use and land governance,
often at the expense of smallholders. Empirical evidence on the agency of actors included and
excluded in land use decision-making remains scarce. This study analyses who influences land
use decision-making, how they do this, and under what circumstances smallholders are included.
Comparing three land use trajectories in southern Myanmar, we analysed actors’ agency—conceived
as the meanings and means behind (re)actions—in land use decision-making using data from
focus groups and interviews. Results showed that uneven distribution of means can lead to
unequal decision-making power, enabling actors with more means to exclude those with less means:
smallholders. However, this only applies in the case of top-down interventions with mutually
exclusive actor interests regarding use of the same land. Where interests are compatible or a mediator
supports smallholders in negotiations, actors are likely to develop a collaboration despite unequal
means, leading to smallholders’ inclusion in decision-making. Transformation of current land
governance towards sustainable development could be promoted by providing mediators to actors
with few means, ensuring equal access for all to formal land tenure, engaging with brokers in the
land governance network, and improving access to knowledge and financial capital for actors with
few means.
Keywords: Burma; land system science; land governance; land use change; smallholders; sustainable
development
1. Introduction
Land governance in Myanmar has seen major changes over the past decades. The military
government in power from 1962 to 2011 established a highly centralised, authoritarian state and a
strongly regulated economy [1], reducing foreign influence to a minimum. Ethnic armed organisations
resisted the central government in what became a long civil war, and Myanmar was outpaced
economically by its neighbouring countries. The military government implemented agricultural
master plans, reformed its land-related laws and policies, and granted concessions to wealthy or
military-related investors in order to increase the number of prosperous large-scale agricultural
projects that would boost development [2–6]. Previous local land users—most of them smallholders
and many practising shifting cultivation—were usually excluded from land use decision-making in
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3823; doi:10.3390/su10103823 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3823 2 of 30
such government-initiated projects, and therefore lost access to the land they had been using. Many
large-scale agricultural projects were implemented in ethnic minority areas or areas of insurgency,
raising concerns that these development initiatives may have served purposes of control and
state-building [7,8]. Moreover, agricultural expansion led to considerable deforestation [2,9]. With the
partial opening of the country under the reform government from 2011 to 2016, national civil-society
organisations as well as national and international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) began
to publicize the concerns of those who had experienced injustice, releasing a growing number of
reports on land conflicts with detrimental outcomes for smallholders and ethnic minorities [10–13].
Besides acquisitions of arable land for commercial purposes, reports point to a growing number of
land acquisitions aimed at conservation—also referred to as “green grabbing”—that threaten the
legitimacy of local (mostly ethnic-minority) communities’ land use and hence their existence [10,14].
Furthermore, increasing liberalisation of the agricultural sector after 2005 and 2011 and the decrease
in armed conflicts after 2011 led to spatial expansion of cash crops like rubber at the cost of forest
ecosystems [2,15–17]. However, land users face a complex and often incoherent conglomerate of laws
and policies that has accumulated over the past decades and makes land tenure a conflictive issue
in Myanmar [18]. In areas where the Myanmar government and ethnic political organisations both
claim authority and decision-making power, land users are even exposed to contradictory policies on
land (see Appendix A). Also relevant for Myanmar’s current but fragile post-war process towards
democracy [19], these developments in Myanmar’s land use systems pose considerable challenges to
sustainability. The dynamics of such developments are crucially shaped by those actors whose agency
counts [20]. Agency generally refers to actors’ ability to act in pursuit of their interests [21]. However,
empirical evidence on agency in the context of land use system transformations in Myanmar is very
scarce to date.
One of the current research frontiers of land system science is the search for a useful framework
for assessing actors’ actions and agency in land use decision-making in the context of transformations
of land use systems and land governance [22,23]. The definition of governance provided by
Graham et al. [24] implies that a multitude of diverse actors—with their power, relationships, and
accountability—as well as formal and informal institutions constitute the governance arena where
decision-making processes take place [25,26]. In this study, we understand governance of land to
encompass and formally and informally regulate, among others, access to land [27,28], land tenure and
land use decision-making, land use changes and trajectories [22,29], customary practices, and formal
policies and laws. Elements of land governance such as policies or decision-making processes can
overlap, but may also conflict with one another or even be contradictory [24]. Scholars stress the critical
role of actors’ actions, agency, and power relations in the context of land governance—including land
use decision-making—and its transformation [30–34]. Eakin et al. [30] and Seto and Reenberg [35]
suggested defining actors’ actions and reactions as the interplay between activities and agency, while
agency in turn is a combination of meaning and means. According to Wiesmann et al. [21] and
Bourdieu [36], the analysis of actors’ agency in terms of meaning and means can yield insights
into power relations, as uneven distribution of material and immaterial means among actors can
cause power imbalances. Accordingly, there is a growing need in land system science for better
understanding how the agency of actors involved in and excluded from land use decision-making
shapes short-term land use changes and long-term land use trajectories [22,29]. Given that actors
contribute to and steer transformations [21,37–40], this understanding can also help to identify potential
leverage points [41,42] for promoting transformations of land systems and their governance towards
sustainable development.
The present paper contributes to this debate in land system science about actors’ actions and
agency in land use decision-making and provides much-needed empirical evidence on whose agency
influences land use decision-making in Myanmar, and why. The study was guided by the following
research questions: How did actors’ actions and reactions shape land use trajectories in Myanmar?
Whose agency counted in land use decision-making, and why? Moreover, as it seems particularly
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important from the point of view of sustainable development that smallholders in Myanmar are
included in land use decision-making, we also asked: How did some smallholders manage to be
included in land use decision-making? To answer these questions, we combined land system scientists’
understanding of action and agency with a human actor model [21] (based on multiple past papers [36,40]),
and the concept of means [21,43] used by sustainability and development scientists.
In this paper, we first describe the basic characteristics of three selected land use trajectories
(including official land zones, the timeline of land use changes, spatiotemporal dynamics, and territorial
claims) and analyse actors’ actions and reactions in terms of their activities and their agency along each
of the three trajectories. This analysis shows what happened along each of the three land use trajectories
and why. In a second step, we compare actor interactions across the three land use trajectories, focusing
on differences and similarities in agency related to the land use trajectories. This comparison sheds
light on why some actors’ agency had a greater influence than others’, and how some smallholders
managed to be included in the making of certain decisions along the land use trajectories. We conclude
that uneven distribution of means among opposing actors in land use decision-making can indeed lead
to an imbalance of decision-making power and targeted use of means by those who have more means
to exclude smallholders who have fewer means. However, this finding only applies in the situation of
top-down interventions where actors’ land use interests are mutually exclusive. In situations where
actors’ land use interests were compatible or where a mediator supported smallholders in land use
negotiations, actors developed a collaboration or at least mutual respect despite uneven distribution
of means.
2. Methods
2.1. Study Area and Case Selection
We adopted a comparative case study design, analysing and comparing actors’ agency in the
context of three different land use trajectories. Our study area is located in Tanintharyi Region, southern
Myanmar (Figure 1). The area is a mix of forest and agricultural land, and land use has developed
along various trajectories over the past 20 years. Within this area, we selected two villages for closer
investigation. Village A has a predominantly Karen-Christian ethnic minority population, whereas
Village B is mainly Burmese-Buddhist. The two villages are situated in different officially designated
land zones. The study area contains large so-called Reserved Forest areas that were established
under British colonial rule and today are administered by the central government’s Department of
Forestry [44] (the term “central” refers to the national-level government of Myanmar). Anyone who
uses land classified as Reserved Forest without permission from the Department of Forestry is acting
illegally (see Appendix A). However, local communities have been using these forests for their own
purposes without official permission. Village A is located inside a Reserved Forest. Accordingly,
land users here can so far not apply for a formal land use certificate. Village B is situated in a zone
designated for agricultural purposes, where land users can apply for a formal land use certificate;
but it is also just outside a Reserved Forest which in 2005 was even upgraded to a more strictly
regulated Nature Reserve. Villages A and B have each experienced one separate and one shared land
use trajectory (LUT):
(1) LUT 1, near Village A: Conversion of forest, shifting cultivation for subsistence, and some cash
crop plantations to an oil palm concession managed by a military company.
(2) LUT 2, near Village B: In 2005, conversion of the inconsistently enforced Reserved Forest into a
more rigorously enforced Nature Reserve (LUT 2a); 12 years later, establishment of a community
forest in the buffer zone of the Nature Reserve, making the use of some forest products possible
again (LUT 2b).
(3) LUT 3, in and around both villages: Expansion of private-sector commercial agriculture—
predominantly cultivation of rubber and areca (betel) nut by various actors—at the expense
of forest and shifting cultivation.
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organisation Karen National Union (KNU) and the Myanmar government’s military as both parties
claimed authority over the area. The KNU also formulated a land use policy in line with their own
system and values (see Appendix A). Even today, the predominantly Karen population of Village A
remains caught in the dilemma of which land use policies to adhere to—those of the KNU or those of
the Myanmar central government.
2.2. Conceptual Framework for Analysing Actors’ Actions and Reactions
To analyse actors’ (re)actions in land use decision-making in LUTs and their agency shaping these
(re)actions, we used a conceptual and analytical framework that draws on the human actor model
of Wiesmann et al. [21], the understanding of action and agency of Eakin et al. [30] and Seto and
Reenberg [35], and the concepts of capitals or means of Bennett et al. [43], Wiesmann et al. [21], and
their sources. In this study, we focus on collective and organisational actors.
Figure 2 illustrates the basic features of the framework. An actor can interact with other actors,
and they might mutually influence each other’s actions and reactions. Actors are embedded in an
institutional context, which may be the same or different for the various actors and influences their
(re)actions. An actor’s action or reaction is a dynamic interplay of activities and the actor’s agency.
Agency is comprised of two interdependent variables: The actor’s goal or interests give meaning
to the (re)action, whereas material and immaterial resources constitute the means that an actor has
to (re)act. A (re)action comprises a number of individual activities. Based on Wiesmann et al. [21],
Bennett et al. [43], and their sources, we differentiate between (1) natural means; (2) human means;
(3) physical means; (4) financial means; (5) social means; and (6) institutional means. We characterised
each of these means based on their distinct components (Appendix B).
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2.3. Data Collection and Analysis
Using this conceptual framework to structure the collection and analysis of qualitative data [45],
we investigated all actors’ actions and reactions involved in shaping the three selected land use
trajectories in the study area. We started with two exploratory focus group discussions with local
residents in each village (n = 11 to 28 participants) to identify key land use changes, their timelines,
and actors involved. On this basis, we identified the following main collective and organisational
actors, (1) smallholders previously practising shifting cultivation and now growing various crops
(land < 15 ha, see Appendix C)), including village leaders; (2) regional entrepreneurs with diverse
activity portfolios often including rubber plantations in various places; (3) a private agribusiness; (4) a
military agro-industrial company with a concession for oil palm cultivation; (5) landless immigrants
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and migrant workers; (6) the Nature Reserve Project (NRP); and (7) an international NGO that facilitates
community forestry. We conducted a total of 31 semi-standardised interviews of 50 to 150 min each
with representatives of these actors, collecting data on their activities, meanings, and means (see
detailed agency components in Appendix B). We analysed the data from the focus group discussions
and interviews using thematic coding and comparative content analysis. Where key data were missing
or contradictory, we consulted further sources to enable triangulation. These included additional
exploratory interviews with local actors and other experts and literature research.
Most interactions were conducted in a Myanmar language (Burmese) in teamwork by the first
author of this paper and a research assistant; few were conducted in English. They were digitally
recorded if participants agreed. The names of individual actors are kept anonymous to reduce the risk
of repercussions. Data collection, analysis, and triangulation lasted from April 2016 to May 2018.
3. Results
3.1. Actors and Their (Re)Actions Shaping Land Use Trajectories
In this section, we present each actor’s activities and agency in each land use trajectory. Table A3
in Appendix C gives an overview of the main actors involved and their agency. As mentioned earlier,
smallholders were the only local actors before the examined land use trajectories unfolded. Over time,
other actors entered the study area, engaged in land use decision-making, and became locally active
actors as well.
3.1.1. LUT 1: Conversion to Military Oil Palm Concession in Village A
As part of its Self-Sufficiency Plan, the military government decided in the late 1990s to reduce
its dependency on imports of cheap palm oil and foster domestic oil palm cultivation on a large
scale in the Tanintharyi Region (see Appendix A). It granted military-owned or -related companies
as well as other private companies medium- to large-scale concessions and motivated, or sometimes
even requested them, to establish oil palm plantations. The concession areas were usually located in
what was officially considered “unproductive wasteland” (later also referred to as vacant, fallow, or
virgin land; see Appendix A) or in Reserved Forests. The government only sometimes considered
the existence of villages or natural ecosystems in the designated concession areas. The KNU strongly
disagreed with this development.
Actors and Their Activities
Around the year 2000, the military government granted an area of 12,140 ha to the predecessor
of the company running the plantation today (see Table 1). The arriving company briefly informed
the village leaders, but did not consult them. The villagers disagreed with the establishment of the
concession, but they did not dare to defend their land as civil war was still ongoing and the village
was already experiencing violent oppression by military forces due to other reasons. The company
started planting oil palms on about 1800 ha while claiming the remaining area of over 10,000 ha of
the concession contract for future expansion. In 2003, the concession was handed over to today’s
military agro-industrial company. Until 2010, this new company continuously expanded its plantations
around Village A and other villages up to around 2750 ha (out of the originally permitted 12,140 ha)
but did not relocate any villages. Various villagers lost access to parts or all of the land they had
been using, as more and more land was converted into oil palm plantations. Those who had enough
human and physical means cleared and cultivated other land in the vicinity of the village. After 2010,
no more expansions by the military company have been observed (see Figure 1 for spatial extent).
In 2011, the company signed a 30-year lease contract with the central Department of Forestry for the
2750 ha already converted and officially returned almost all of the remaining concession land (approx.
9000 ha) back to the Department of Forestry. Overall, this land use trajectory is an example of top-down
interventions leading to abrupt changes in land use decision-making.
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Table 1. Basic characteristics of land use trajectory (LUT) 1.
Land Zone 1 Time
Actors Using the
Land Land Use
Spatiotemporal
Dynamics
Territorial Claims
and
Consequences
Reserved
Forest
Before the
conversions,
until late
1990s/2000 2
Smallholders in a
customary land use
and land tenure
system 3
Use of forest products,
shifting cultivation,
some cash crop
plantations
Top-down
abrupt change
in land use
decision-making,
gradual change
of land use due
to large spatial
scale
Previous and new
actors both claimed
the same land
(company claimed
larger area).
Smallholders had
to withdraw.
Conflicts and
resentments arose
between the
two actors.
From approx.
2000 to today
Military company
(first company
approx. 2000–2002,
second company
2003–today)
Large-scale oil palm
concession, gradual
clearing of forest and
conversion of
smallholders’ shifting
cultivation and
plantations from approx.
2000 until 2010
1 Official land category defined by the central government. 2 Different sources provide different years; the concession
was granted sometime between 1997 and 2000. 3 Administratively, the Department of Forestry would have been in
charge of land use decision-making; however, smallholders were unaware of the legislation and decided on the
ground how to use the land.
The company offered jobs to the surrounding villages’ residents, but most villagers refused.
Some villagers worked for the company on a very short-term basis, but no villager was permanently
employed. The around 200 workers employed by the company were almost all migrant workers from
other regions of Myanmar.
At the time of fieldwork in 2017, the company and smallholders both reported several previous
conflicts, but no active ones. The company representatives stressed that they tried to avoid clashes
with smallholders but had not succeeded in preventing all conflicts. The villagers in turn insisted that
the land had originally belonged to the local people and that they wished for it to be returned.
Actors’ Agency
The meanings behind the actors’ actions and reactions diverged strongly. The goal of the military
company was to produce palm oil for their own soap factory, providing affordable soap for the domestic
market and military camps throughout Myanmar (see Table A3). Local smallholders, who were
extraordinarily poor and affected by military forces’ repression (unrelated to the company), strived to
survive the civil war and produce enough food for their families by engaging in shifting cultivation
for subsistence and few cash crops. They did not want to work on the military company’s plantation,
as they preferred to cultivate their own land and had no interest in collaborating with the company.
The result was an influx of mostly poor and landless migrant workers from distant places who were
eager to work for the company to improve their difficult livelihood situation.
The company and the smallholders also had very different means (see Table A3). Strong social
connections gave the military company access to influential land use decision-makers in the central
and regional government. This enabled the company to obtain the formal concession—its institutional
means that enabled it to disregard smallholders’ claims, who had no formal land use titles. Moreover,
smallholders were intimidated by the company’s proximity to the military, with the military forces’
reputation among Karen people of being violent; this reputation of the military forces constituted
an informal institutional means for the company. It explains smallholders’ reactive attitude of
withdrawing instead of proactively opposing the company even though the company did never
make use of any military forces. The company then drew on its major financial means to implement
the conversions, acquiring physical and human means and obtaining knowledge from governmental
representatives as well as national and international study tours.
Smallholders, by contrast, had no formal land use titles apart from their customary system of oral
agreements with witnesses. Accordingly, they had no official permit for their shifting cultivation and
crop plantations outside the village centre or for their use of the forest (see Table A3). Given that the
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area is a Reserved Forest, villagers’ agricultural practices were formally even illegal (see Appendix A).
Moreover, smallholders hardly had any access to financial means, nor did they own or have access to
substantial physical or human means.
For the immigrant workers, who found the employment through their personal network, the
situation offered an opportunity to generally increase their means.
3.1.2. LUT 2: Conversion to Nature Reserve and Later Community Forestry near Village B
In 1992, the first international oil and gas company entered a collaboration with Myanmar’s central
government to explore and produce natural gas for export to Thailand, despite disapproval of the KNU.
Over the following years, several oil and gas companies settled in the study area. As environmental
compensation for the pipelines to Bangkok crossing the so-called Myanmar Southern Forest Complex,
three international oil and gas companies provided funding for the Nature Reserve Project (NRP),
a central-level semi-governmental organisation at the Department of Forestry, tasked with establishing
and maintaining a Nature Reserve. In 2005, the Nature Reserve was established on the area already
designated as Reserved Forest (see Figure 1) and was entitled with the official land category of
Protected Public Forest (for more background information on the Nature Reserve and Karen villages,
see Appendix D).
Actors and Their Activities
Changes occurred in two phases (see Table 2). Before the establishment of the Nature Reserve,
the villagers made full use of all forest products, hunted in the forest, and—due to population
growth—continuously extended their shifting cultivation and plantations into what at that time
was a Reserved Forest. The villagers managed and used the land and forest according to their
customary system. In the first phase (LUT 2a), starting in 2005, NRP arrived as a new actor in the area
and established the Nature Reserve several miles away from the settlement area of Village B. To our
knowledge, there had not been any prior negotiation with local communities. However, NRP respected
the already existing cultivations of smallholders. Over the first years, NRP held numerous information
events and trainings for nearby villages, marked the boundaries, and set up ranger offices in villages.
For villagers (and other land users), the establishment of the Nature Reserve meant that they were
from that point on no longer allowed to use the forest for collecting timber and nontimber forest
products or hunting, as well as to clear more forest for making forest land cultivable. Any trespassing
and violating of rules could result in retribution. For security reasons, NRP rangers were not allowed
to patrol in areas of active insurgency or fighting (inside the Nature Reserve), but they managed to
build up law enforcement in the areas without insurgencies along the Western boundary of the Nature
Reserve where Village B is located. Accordingly, people in this area increasingly refrained from forest
use. This first phase of LUT 2 is thus another example of a top-down intervention leading to an abrupt
change in land use decision-making.
In a later phase (LUT 2b), starting in 2015, an international NGO arrived in the Tanintharyi Region
and opened an office near Village B. In collaboration with the Department of Forestry (including a
memorandum of understanding) and NRP, this NGO conducted a series of information events in the
area, motivating villages to apply for a community forestry (CF) certificate, which according to the law
would have been possible since 1995. Like in many other regions, local villagers had not been aware
of this possibility. With the intensified assistance, trainings, and funding from the NGO since 2015,
Village B finally applied for a community forest in the buffer zone of the Nature Reserve (see Figure 1).
NRP immediately agreed with their plans. In July 2017, the district-level Department of Forestry issued
a 30-year land use certificate to the CF group. Thus this phase also led to an abrupt change in land use
decision-making, but it was preceded by negotiations and consultations.
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Table 2. Basic characteristics of land use trajectory (LUT) 2.
Land Zone 1 Time
Actors Using the
Land Land Use
Spatiotemporal
Dynamics
Territorial Claims and
Consequences
Hills further
away from
main road:
Reserved
Forest,
upgraded to
Nature Reserve
(legal land
category:
Protected
Public Forest)
in 2005 2
Before the
conversions,
until 2005 1
Smallholders in a
customary land use
and land tenure
system 3
Use of forest
products, hunting,
shifting cultivation,
few cash crop
plantations
Top-down
abrupt change
in land use
decision-making,
gradual change
of land use due
to large spatial
scale
Previous and new actors
both claimed the same
land (NRP claimed larger
area). Smallholders along
the Nature Reserve
boundary had to give up
forest use. This led to
resentments among
smallholders, but no
violent conflict.
2005–2015
(LUT 2a)
The newly created
Nature Reserve
Project (NRP)
Nature Reserve as
large-scale
protected forest,
use of forest
products and forest
encroachment no
longer allowed 4
Since 2015
(LUT 2b)
Community
Forestry (CF)
group (comprised
of smallholders
and other
villagers),
supported by an
international NGO
and NRP
Establishment of a
medium-scale CF
area in the buffer
zone of the Nature
Reserve for
communal use of
forest
Abrupt but
previously
negotiated
change of land
use
decision-making
and land use
The CF group claimed a
specific area within the
territory controlled by
NRP. Collaboration
developed among all
actors.
1 Official land category defined by the central government; 2 the land along the main road is in a different zone
(agricultural land, vacant and fallow land). However, in this LUT we focus on the Reserved Forest and the
designated Nature Reserve (official land category in the legislation is Protected Public Forest). 3 Administratively,
the Department of Forestry would have been in charge of land use decision-making; however, smallholders were
unaware of the legislation and decided on the ground how to use the land. 4 Any activities in the official buffer
zone—the outermost mile of the Nature Reserve—must be approved by NRP. Inside the core zone of the Nature
Reserve, all activity or trespassing is strictly prohibited.
Actors’ Agency
In the first phase (LUT 2a), when NRP arrived, the meanings behind actors’ actions differed.
While NRP mainly aimed to conserve biodiversity in collaboration with local communities (see
Table A3), smallholders were concerned with surviving the civil war and having enough food.
Accordingly, most smallholders wanted to use the forest as a source of food, building material, and
land for cultivation expansion, and some, additionally, as a source of income based on informal selling
of timber. NRP was willing to collaborate with local communities, but took measures to discourage
smallholders from contributing to deforestation and forest degradation.
The distribution of means between these two actors was strongly asymmetrical. The formal
connections between the central Department of Forestry and the oil and gas companies enabled the
foundation of semi-governmental NRP as a new actor in a public–private partnership. From the
beginning, NRP found itself well embedded in a strong collaborative social network between the
Department of Forestry, the oil and gas companies, and itself. In addition, NRP could rely on its
institutional means, namely the official mandate to implement and maintain the formally designated
Nature Reserve. Moreover, having obtained substantial financial means (see Table A3), NRP could
acquire human and physical means to implement the Nature Reserve. The smallholders, having far
fewer means, could not compete with this new actor for access to the forest. They had no formal
institutional means to support their forest use, but rather acted according to their customary system.
The arrival of NRP drastically reduced their access to natural and physical means from primary
forest, and indirectly also to financial means. At the beginning they did not accept this, but then they
gradually gave up the use of primary forest. Being unaware of the legal options they had under CF
regulations, they did not yet consider applying for a community forest.
In the latter phase (LUT 2b), after the arrival of the international NGO in 2015, the meanings behind
all involved actors’ actions became compatible thanks to facilitation by the NGO. The NGO pursued
the goal of empowering local people for sustainable forest management under the international REDD+
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programme. Based on the formal CF Instructions under the Forest Law (see Appendix A) and with the
support of the NGO, the CF group-to-be formulated its long-term interest in maintaining and using
the forest’s natural resources. This meaning aligned with NRP’s meaning of conserving biodiversity in
collaboration with local communities. Accordingly, NRP supported the endeavour of the CF group
and the NGO to establish a community forest in the buffer zone of the Nature Reserve.
In this phase, too, the distribution of means among the actors was strongly asymmetrical
(see Table A3). However, the actors did not use their means to compete with each other.
The international NGO assisted the CF group in obtaining their ultimate institutional means: formal
approval of their CF land use. The NGO did so by providing the group access to its social, human
(knowledge and skills), and financial means. For instance, the NGO held several capacity building
sessions with the CF group to inform them about their options and duties, assisted them with technical
skills such as GPS geolocation for the CF application, supported them in communicating with the
district Department of Forestry and other departments, and provided funding for purchasing tools
needed for forest management.
3.1.3. LUT 3: Expansion of Private-Sector Commercial Agriculture in Both Villages
Actors and Their Activities
The private agribusiness in Village B was the first private actor to become considerably involved
in commercial agriculture. The company had reacted to the government’s Self-Sufficiency Plan and the
2000 to 2030 Master Plan for the Agriculture Sector (see Appendix A), which promoted the cultivation
of oil palms in Tanintharyi Region. The regional government granted the company permission to
cultivate so-called wasteland (later referred to as vacant, fallow, or virgin land, see Appendix A),
which was mostly forested and unused by villagers. The agribusiness started in 1998 (see Table 3)
with 105 ha at the outskirts of Village B, mostly growing oil palm except for 10 ha of rubber. Later, the
company realised that palm oil was not a profitable business and concentrated on other crops instead.
Continual expansions up to today’s total area of 384 ha led to forest clearance, but not to conflict with
villagers. The agribusiness and villagers have coexisted based on informal mutual consent, as the
agribusiness supported the village with donations and exchanged frequently with the village leaders.
With the establishment of the agribusiness, migrant workers from distant regions started to settle on
the company’s compound.
Table 3. Basic characteristics of land use trajectory (LUT) 3.
Land Zone 1 Time
Actors Using the
Land Land Use
Spatiotemporal
Dynamics
Territorial
Claims and
Consequences
Village A: Reserved
Forest;
Village B:
Agricultural land,
garden land, vacant
and fallow land 2
Before the
conversions
Smallholders in a
customary land use
and land tenure
system
Forest, use of
forest products,
shifting
cultivation,
some cash crop
plantations
Gradual and
patchy change
of land use
decision-making
and land use
Previous and
new actors both
claimed land in
the same area,
but not the
same plots. No
major conflicts
or resentments.
From 1998 to
today (in waves
occurring
around 1998,
2006, and 2011)
Smallholders
(both villages),
agribusiness
(Village B), regional
entrepreneurs
(both villages)
Gradual and
patchy
expansion of
private-sector
commercial
agriculture
1 Official land category defined by the central government; 2 the land on the hills towards the east was designated
as Reserved Forest and since 2005 as Nature Reserve (Protected Public Forest). However, in this LUT 3 we focus on
the agricultural land near the main road (see Figure 1).
In 2006, the agribusiness began to intensify rubber cultivation in response to institutional and
economic incentives for rubber production created by the central government (see Appendix A).
The incentives also attracted regional entrepreneurs from nearby towns, who acquired land at the
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outskirts of both villages with the help of local land brokers and also began to cultivate rubber,
though only on a small to medium scale. Around 2007, inspired by the agribusiness and the regional
entrepreneurs, all of whom are part of the regional elite, some smallholders also began to cultivate
rubber. They usually converted some of their shifting cultivation plots to rubber plantations. With this
gradual development of commercial agriculture, more migrant workers settled in or near both villages,
usually working for the agribusiness or regional entrepreneurs. After the devastating cyclone Nargis
hit Myanmar at the latitude of Yangon in 2008, the number of landless migrants looking for a future in
the south increased significantly.
The decrease in armed conflicts and the market liberalisations that took place after 2011, as well as
land-related reforms carried out in 2012, triggered a third wave of expansion of commercial agriculture.
Smallholders stated that rubber and the areca nut (betel nut) were the main new crops they had
started to grow since 2011, alongside some old crops such as cashew nut, black pepper, or fruits.
In 2014, the agribusiness also began to produce areca nuts as they fetched a more attractive return
on investment and a more stable market price compared to rubber. None of the actors have so far
succeeded in producing good-quality rubber. Almost all rubber producers stated that income from
latex production was much lower than what they had expected when they began to grow rubber.
No major conflicts between the coexisting actors have been reported. The agribusiness as well
as the regional entrepreneurs—the regional elite—respected the smallholders’ customary land use
system and in the predominantly Karen Village A also the KNU’s land use policy. The smallholders in
both villages did not really welcome the rather speculative land acquisitions by regional entrepreneurs,
as they reduced the availability of unused land; but they did not oppose them either.
Actors’ Agency
The meanings guiding actors’ actions were compatible. All involved actors’ actions and reactions
were mainly driven by economic interests (see Table A3), and at the outset of this land use the trajectory
of the availability of land was not yet a limiting aspect. Nonetheless, the reasons why actors developed
similar meanings differed to some extent. Smallholders were unable to develop economic interests in
commercial farming as long as more pressing problems such as food insecurity and civil war prevailed
and markets were difficult to access. However, as the overall conditions improved, they began to strive
for increased income generation in order to satisfy their basic needs and send their children to school.
Regional entrepreneurs pursued economic interests not to satisfy their basic needs but to secure the
livelihood improvements that their parents and they themselves had achieved (e.g., plantations, decent
house, and increased financial income) and to further increase their resources to offer their children
better prospects (mostly education). Some made speculative land purchases to further expand their
investment. The private agribusiness, also driven by economic interests, additionally aimed at overall
regional development. For instance, the main owner was also involved in regional trading associations,
political consulting, health infrastructure and service development, and many more projects. Migrant
workers from distant regions, also striving for more income, found a possibility to improve their basic
livelihoods, similar to the smallholders. In addition, migrant workers hoped to earn enough money to
eventually be able to buy their own land (some in their hometown and some in the study area).
The natural, human, physical, financial, and social means that the various actors owned or
had access to increased proportionally to the migrant workers to the smallholders to the regional
entrepreneurs to the agribusiness (see Table A3 in Appendix C). The distribution of institutional
means, however, followed a different pattern: it depended on the village and the relevant official land
zone. While all land users in Village B had reasonable formal tenure security for their plantations
(see Table A3 in Appendix C), land users in Village A—including regional entrepreneurs—had never
held formal land use certificates because Village A is located in a Reserved Forest where agriculture is
officially illegal.
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3.2. Comparative Analysis: Whose Agency Counted in Land Use Decision-Making and Why
Table 4 summarizes the results of the comparative analysis of the three land use trajectories
studied. The trajectories show different patterns of agency. Looking at actor relations, the new actors
were predominant in LUT 1 and LUT 2a, whereas smallholders exercised agency in a more pronounced
manner in LUT 2b and LUT 3, resulting in peaceful coexistence among smallholders and new actors.
Regarding territorial claims, one might expect that smallholders are excluded from decision-making
when actors with more means claim the same land. This proved to be true in LUT 1 and LUT 2a.
In LUT 2b, however, smallholders in the form of a CF group managed to be included in land use
decision-making even though they claimed the same land as NRP, who had ample means. These and
other differences can be attributed to the varying patterns of agency described in the following section.
Table 4. Comparison of actors’ agency in land use trajectories (LUTs).
LUT 1: Conversion to
Oil Palm Concession
LUT 2: Conversion of Forest Use LUT 3: Expansion
of Private-Sector
Commercial
Agriculture
LUT 2a: Conversion to
Nature Reserve
LUT 2b: Partial
Conversion to
Community Forestry (CF)
Actor relations in
land use
decision-making:
Whose agency
counted?
Predominance of
military company,
smallholders excluded
Predominance of Nature
Reserve Project (NRP),
smallholders excluded
Peaceful coexistence
among all actors, all actors
included
Peaceful
coexistence among
all actors, all actors
included
Characteristics of
land use
decision-making
process
Top-down intervention;
actors claimed same land
Top-down intervention; actors
claimed same land
Consultations and
negotiations held; actors
claimed same land
No interference,
some consultations,
actors claimed
different plots of
land
Meanings behind
actors’ (re)actions
Diverging: industrial
production versus
securing of livelihood
Diverging: conservation
versus securing of livelihood
Compatible:
community-based
sustainable management
of forest
Compatible:
income generation,
economic
development
Means available for
actors’ (re)actions
Strong asymmetry,
company used its means
to establish oil palm
plantations
Strong asymmetry, NRP used
means to reduce smallholders’
forest use
Strong asymmetry, NGO
used means to facilitate
increased access to means
for CF group-to-be
Graded asymmetry,
each actor used
means without
interfering with
others’ land
Main means that
brought about the
change in land use
decision-making
(1) National-level formal
land use permit
(institutional means),
achieved through social
network (social means)
(2) Financial means to
ensure the other means
(3) Intimidating
reputation of military
(company’s
institutional means)
(1) National-level formal
mandate to implement the
Nature Reserve (institutional
means), achieved through
social network (social means)
(2) Financial means to ensure
the other means for
implementation, achieved
through social means (NRP
very close to oil and
gas companies)
(1) District-level formal
land use certificate
(institutional means),
achieved through social
means (connection
to NGO)
(2) Human (knowledge)
and financial means,
achieved through social
means (support
from NGO)
(1) All means are
similarly
important; but
access to financial
means can help to
ensure other
necessary means
3.2.1. Role of Meaning
Among the four situations in the three LUTs (LUT 2 comprises two situations), we encountered
two situations where actor interests (meanings ascribed to actions) diverged and two situations where
they were compatible. In the two situations with diverging interests, we noted that smallholders had
been excluded from land use decision-making. In LUT 1, the military company aimed to produce
palm oil for soap manufacturing, while the smallholders’ concern was to maintain their food security
and survive the civil war involving various armed conflicts around their village. In this situation,
the military company was using its means (see Table A3) to implement the land use changes against
the smallholders’ will. In LUT 2a, NRP implemented a Nature Reserve with the aim of biodiversity
conservation, whereas the smallholders aimed at maintaining their food security. NRP excluded
the smallholders from land use decision-making by gradually restricting their access to the forest,
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making use of its vast means to successfully implement the Nature Reserve. Both situations represent
a top-down intervention without prior negotiation where smallholders would have been involved.
In the two situations where actor interests were compatible, coexistence was peaceful and even
constructive without any major top-down interventions. In LUT 2b, the NGO as well as the CF
group-to-be both aimed at communal use of the forest. The NRP and the Department of Forestry both
agreed with this, as long as the CF group complied with their rules and regulations for sustainable
forest use. After approval of the community forest and the formation of a CF group, the smallholders
were therefore no longer a competing actor for NRP, but rather a potential collaborator for improved
forest management who pursued similar interests. Members of the CF group and the NRP forest
rangers even stated that they now usually patrolled the forest together and that this was giving them
increased satisfaction. In LUT 3, all actors indicated that they aimed to generate more income from
their land use. As a rule, no actor interfered with any other land user. In many cases, actors even
benefitted from each other: While smallholders perceived the agribusiness and regional entrepreneurs
as economic innovators and important casual employers, the agribusiness and regional entrepreneurs
partly relied on smallholders as casual labourers on their plantations. Even the migrant workers’
interest in generating income to improve their livelihood did not conflict much with any other actor’s
interests, including those of the smallholders. Migrant workers usually worked permanently or at
least seasonally on the plantations of the agribusiness and regional entrepreneurs. Smallholders were
mostly interested in short-term casual labour on plantations, as they preferred to work on their own
land (with few exceptions). When local smallholders or their children sought permanent or seasonal
employment, they usually migrated to nearby Thailand, where wages were higher than in Myanmar.
3.2.2. Role of Means
The distribution of means among the actors was uneven in all four situations (see Table 4). New
actors entering the land system usually had substantially more means than the local smallholders—with
the exception of the migrant workers.
Comparison of all situations showed that institutional means were relevant in enabling actors to
become land use decision-makers in three of them, namely in LUT 1, LUT 2a, and LUT 2b. In all three
situations, the change in land use decision-making was abrupt. In LUT 1 and LUT 2a, smallholders
did not own or have access to formal land titles issued by the central government, whereas the
new actors held land use certificates or a mandate from the central government. In LUT 1, the
military company used its concession to claim decision-making power over the land under concession,
while the smallholders had no formal certificate to prove the rightfulness of their land use and
tenure; what was much worse was that their activities were formally illegal according to Reserved
Forest regulations, even though these regulations had never been strictly enforced (see Appendix A).
In LUT 2a, NRP received a mandate from the central Department of Forestry to implement the Nature
Reserve. This official mandate legitimised their appropriation of decision-making power over the
designated forest, whereas in this case, too, the smallholders had no formal recognition of their use of
the nearby forest to support their right to being included in decision-making. In both LUT 1 and LUT
2a, smallholders were excluded from land use decision-making because new actors brought formal
institutions into a customary system—formal institutions that may have existed but until then had
not been enforced in the study area. In LUT 2b, the very same smallholders who had been excluded
in LUT 2a regained access to decision-making on the same forest by formally registering as a CF
group and receiving a formal CF land use certificate. However, the CF group needed to comply with
the national-level instructions for CF and Nature Reserve regulations. Thus, in all these situations,
formal institutional means such as land titles—unlike informal, customary institutional means—where
critical for actors to be included in or to dominate land use decision-making. As confirmed by several
interview partners, the higher the level of the government authority issuing a land title, certificate, or
mandate, the more power it gives its owner.
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Strikingly, in all these situations, the actors’ social means were crucial to obtaining formal land
titles. In LUT 1, the military company was closely connected to the national- and regional-level
committees in charge granting land concessions. In LUT 2a, NRP was closely connected to the forestry
departments at all levels who decided, based on existing legislation, to implement the Nature Reserve.
In LUT 2b, the CF group received access to substantial new means by collaborating closely with the
NGO. Even in LUT 3, the agribusiness owner proved to be well-connected to the regional, district,
and township governments, to whom he repeatedly applied for permission to cultivate “wasteland”.
These individuals and organisations thus seem to have used their social networks as instruments for
obtaining the necessary formal land use certificates. Our findings show that access to social networks
at higher administrative levels can be decisive when it comes to being included in or even dominating
land use decision-making.
Further, in LUT 2b, access to knowledge (human means) was essential in enabling the CF
group-to-be to apply for a community forest. One might argue that in LUT 1, LUT 2a, and LUT 3
knowledge about how to apply for a land use certificate was no less essential for actors to acquire their
institutional means.
In LUT 3, where land use decision-making changed gradually in patches, all means were similarly
important, and each actor acted according to the means they had and the meanings they attributed
to their actions. Their peaceful coexistence may be explained by the fact that previous and new land
users did not claim the same land, but rather acquired separate plots. However, it might also be
connected to the circumstance that the new actors were from the same region and more familiar with
and considerate of the conditions in which smallholders in the area live and work.
In all four situations, one type of means was relevant for the implementation of changes in land
use, but not obviously relevant for bringing about changes in land use decision-making: financial
means. Having decision-making power did not necessarily lead to an immediate change in land use.
This was apparent in LUT 1 and LUT 2a, where the changes in land use happened gradually after
land use decision-making had changed abruptly. Implementing land use changes required various
types of means such as human (e.g., labour), physical (e.g., tools, saplings), and financial means.
Financial means enabled actors to acquire the other types of means where necessary. Accordingly,
access to financial capital is another particularly powerful means in land use competitions. For instance,
the military company (LUT 1) was able to maintain and expand its plantations even though palm oil
production was not profitable because it had access to income from other businesses and tax income.
The NRP (LUT 2a) used its vast funds to hire project staff, conduct information events, and mark the
Nature Reserve boundaries, for example. In LUT 3, actors with greater financial capital were able
to acquire larger areas of land, hire labour, and access more or newer technologies for agricultural
production and communication.
3.3. Inclusion of Smallholders’ Agency in Land Use Decision-Making
Since the inclusion of smallholders in land use decision-making is important from the point of
view of sustainable development, we sought to identify situations and conditions where smallholders’
agency was, indeed, included in land use decision-making. The comparison of all actors’ interactions
revealed three circumstances that contributed to—but did not guarantee—smallholders being
included in land use decision-making despite the presence of actors who had more means than
the smallholders did:
First, having a formal land tenure certificate issued by the Myanmar government and being
located in an agricultural land zone contributed to smallholders being able to decide about use of
their own land. In Village B, which is located in an agricultural land zone, holders of either a “Form
Seven” land use certificate (after 2012) or at least a crop tax receipt for the land they cultivated did
not experience any dispossession by actors with more means. Some smallholders who had not paid
the crop taxes (for various reasons) and therefore had no crop tax receipt were dispossessed by other
land users with more means. In Village A, most land use activities of smallholders and regional
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entrepreneurs are illegal because the land is in a Reserved Forest. For that reason, land users have so
far never had a formal land title. Some smallholders in Village A reported that the KNU had started to
issue land use certificates to Karen people to increase their land tenure security, and that smallholders
greatly appreciated this. However, they also stressed that these certificates would be less legitimate
before the Myanmar national law than a land use certificate issued by the Myanmar government.
Second, a mediating actor with considerable means (the NGO in LUT 2b) facilitated capacity
building and constructive mediation on land use decision-making for actors with comparably few
means (smallholders), who then formed a CF group (LUT 2b). This facilitating actor considerably
improved the smallholders’ inclusion in land use decision-making. However, this was only possible
because there was a legal framework that all actors could refer to; in this case, the national Forest Law
with the CF Instructions (see Appendix A).
Third, compatible land user interests (meanings ascribed to actions) facilitated collaboration
(see also Section 3.2.1). Where coexisting actors had similar rather than mutually exclusive land use
interests there was no conflict or exclusion. The collaboration of NRP with the CF group and the
NGO (LUT 2b) and private-sector-based agricultural expansion (LUT 3) illustrate how a peaceful
environment can stimulate constructive collaboration or at least mutual respect. In these two situations,
the smallholders’ agency had a substantial influence on land use decision-making.
4. Discussion
Myanmar has experienced profound transformations of land use systems and land governance,
with different actors being included in or excluded from land use decision-making [1,2,4,6,11].
Development actors in Myanmar as well as land system scientists and sustainability scientists have
broadly stressed the importance of understanding the agency of actors involved in—or excluded
from—such transformations [21,22,30,32–34,37–39]: This knowledge is needed if we aim to promote
the transformation of land governance towards sustainable development.
4.1. A Framework for Analysing Actors’ Actions and Reactions Based on Their Agency
Overall, we perceived the applied actor (re)action framework as useful for understanding how
and why actors shape land use changes in the short term and land use trajectories in the long term.
The operationalisation of agency through meanings and means—with their various components (see
Appendix B)—helped to capture both visible and invisible aspects of actions and reactions. As stated
by Wiesmann et al. [21], we can only observe activities and, to some extent, means, but a (re)action
encompasses more than just these visible aspects. Our framework’s operationalisation of agency
enabled us to disentangle the complexity of actions and reactions by identifying the visible aspects
of activities and means while also capturing the invisible aspects of meanings and some types of
means, such as institutional, social, and financial means, as well as knowledge. Insights into the subtle
differences between different actors’ agency improved our understanding of how and why some actors
were included in land use decision-making whereas others were excluded, and hence, why some
actors’ agency had a greater influence on land use decision-making than others’ did. These insights
also enabled us to identify factors that made it possible for smallholders to be included in land use
decision-making. Overall, our analysis helped us locate leverage points for sustainable development,
as it captured past and current weak points in the land system, such as the formalisation of land
titles or lack of social networks, knowledge, and financial capital among smallholders. However,
the operationalisation of the framework also entailed some challenges for data collection. It is a
time-consuming and lengthy process, especially if samples need to be large. Moreover, respondents
must be willing and able to share their data, which might not always be the case in every context.
4.2. Leverage Points for Transforming Myanmar’s Land Governance Towards Sustainable Development
The current Myanmar government is already undertaking many actions for transforming the land
governance towards more sustainable development. As actors contribute to/steer transformations [21,37–40],
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the conducted analysis of actors’ agency in land use decision-making supported the identification of
potential leverage points [41,42] for further supporting the transformation of this land system towards
sustainable development. We have identified four leverage points. First, as experienced in LUT 2,
where the interests of the competing actors (smallholders and NRP) regarding use of the same land
diverged, a mediator (the NGO) facilitated constructive communication between the two parties and
further actors, supported the identification of a shared interest, and improved smallholders’ access
to necessary means such as social networks, knowledge, financial capital, and finally formal land
tenure, which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain. This finding is consistent with
studies from other countries which showed how, for example in Cambodia, domestic and international
NGOs supported local communities’ resistance against large-scale land concessions [46] and exerted
pressure on the government [47], or how, in Mozambique, NGOs collaborated with smallholders to
avert land and water deals initiated by commercial investors [48]. Thus, even in conflictual large-scale
land acquisitions, external actors can create advocacy support and mediators can assume the role of
a facilitator [49]. In Sweden, mediators managed to support trust-building between actors, facilitate
knowledge generation, and foster innovations for adaptive comanagement of wetlands [50]. Therefore,
the targeted and preferably constructive involvement of such mediators—also referred to as bridging
or boundary actors [50–52]—in land use decision-making and land governance negotiations could
serve as a leverage point for transforming Myanmar’s land governance towards greater sustainability.
Second, our results have shown that formal land tenure recognition was crucial. Those actors
who owned or had access to formal land titles were able to dominate or at least be included in land
use decision-making. Other studies from Myanmar have also criticised the lack of formal land tenure
recognition for smallholders [11,12,18,53]. At the time of submission of this paper, the Myanmar
government was undertaking various attempts to integrate traditional land use systems and the use of
Reserved Forests in its laws. So far however, the institutional framework of the Myanmar government
has formally recognised neither customary or communal land tenure arrangements nor the use of land
in Reserved Forests—situations that are both widespread in Myanmar’s ethnic regions [4,12,53,54].
This makes it impossible for many smallholders—like those in Village A—to access formal land tenure,
thereby putting them at increased risk of expropriation and exclusion and limiting their access to
credits and mortgages. However, some studies from Myanmar have demonstrated that the current
institutional framework of formal land tenure recognition—“Form Seven” under the 2012 Farmland
Law—is discriminatory against women and ethnic minorities [4,11,55]. Studies focusing on other
developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa have further highlighted that national attempts
to formalize land may risk to open windows of opportunity for land speculation, elite capture, and
legitimisation of state land, which in turn lead to poverty traps, as speculative or accumulative land
acquisitions often happen at the expense of the more vulnerable groups [56–58]. These risks, and
the importance of achieving good land tenure governance, are even greater in post-war countries,
where institutional confusion still largely prevails and a variety of actors make claims on land tenure
solutions as a crucial element of the peace process [57,59,60]. This is also the case in Myanmar.
The formalisation of land titles including formal recognition of customary tenure system thus stand
out as an important leverage point for transformation towards sustainable development. However,
relevant procedures and impacts must be well-assessed, just, transparent, and monitored, and involved
actors must be held accountable so as to prevent unsustainable trajectories like social exclusion or
environmental degradation.
Third, we have seen in all LUTs that social networks played a crucial role in accessing the means
needed to be able to participate in land use decision-making (e.g., formal land titles, knowledge, and
financial capital). International conceptual and empirical studies underscore that social networks
can have a strong influence on natural resource governance [61–64]. In Cambodia and Laos,
for example, factors such as access to power, political networking, and connections to influential
elites proved to be relevant in enabling citizens to successfully resist land grabbing [46,65]. Central or
bridging actors [66,67] occupy an influential position in a social network and can become brokers for
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transformations [68,69], as their networks enable them to mobilize specific actors and also a comparably
large number of actors. Scholars and development practitioners likewise underline the crucial role
of informal power holders (e.g., traditional or religious leaders, socially, economically, or politically
influential elites, and respected experts) in transformations, as they can influence both their followers
and formal power holders in one direction or another [70–73]. In Kenya, for example, a social network
study managed to identify the bridging actors between coastal fishers and conservation organisations
and thereby contributed to improving a socially accepted mode of conservation diffusion through
more effective collaboration [74]. Based on our own results as well as similar findings from other
studies, we consider targeted work with central or bridging actors in the role of brokers and with their
social networks another considerable leverage point for supporting transformation of Myanmar’s land
governance towards sustainable development.
Finally, our results have shown that knowledge and financial capital were both useful means
to access other means. Other studies provide similar findings. A study from Rwanda, for example,
illustrated how financial capital was necessary for farmers to join associations that controlled fertile
swamplands; this led to the exclusion of poorer households, who could not afford the membership
fees [57]. In Chile, lack of access to loans prevented smallholders from entering the emerging fruit and
vegetable business; as a result, most smallholders sold their land to entrepreneurs [75]. Smallholders in
Vietnam and many other countries also lack knowledge of how to access land titles [76,77]. Accordingly,
we argue that providing access to knowledge (e.g., land tenure options, agricultural techniques, credit
options, etc.) and financial capital (e.g., microcredits) to actors who have comparably few means—such
as smallholders or landless people—might serve as a further leverage point for enabling sustainable
land use decision-making in Myanmar.
Nonetheless, our results also showed that LUT 1 and LUT 3 led to considerable environmental
degradation (e.g., deforestation) and that LUT 1 and LUT 2a increased socioeconomic disparities
(e.g., exclusion of smallholders from land use decision-making). Future land governance in
Myanmar should therefore also endeavour to design sustainability-oriented regulations for land
use decision-making and land use.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an analysis of actors’ actions and reactions, as well as the agency
behind them, in land use decision-making along three land use trajectories in southern Myanmar.
We identified whose agency—conceived as the meanings and means behind (re)actions—influenced
land use decision-making at what stage of the trajectory, and why.
In situations where the previous and new actors all claimed the same or at least parts of the
same area of land for their use, formal land tenure recognition was the decisive means that secured
decision-making power over the relevant land. Such certificates were always obtained through social
connections; knowledge was likewise needed to obtain formal land tenure recognition. Where previous
and new actors claimed different land for their use and land use and land use decision-making changed
gradually in patches, all means were equally important and each actor acted according to the means
they had and the meanings they attributed to their actions. In all situations, financial means were
useful in implementing land use changes because they enabled actors to acquire other necessary means.
In two situations, smallholders were excluded from land use decision-making as a result of a
top-down intervention. This exclusion also concurred with the circumstance that the competing actors
pursued mutually exclusive interests regarding use of the same land. In both these situations, those
actors who had the stronger means dominated land use decision-making. In one of these situations, a
mediator later facilitated the identification of compatible interests and supported the establishment of
a constructive collaboration between the previously competing actors. Overall, the existence of shared
interests among actors led to the development of a peaceful and constructive collaboration.
We can conclude that an uneven distribution of means among actors may indeed create a power
imbalance, especially in the context of top-down interventions. However, it does not necessarily lead to
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the exclusion of those with fewer means from land use decision-making or to any other disadvantages
for them. Three circumstances increased the chances of smallholders with comparably weak means
being included in land use decision-making: First, their access to formal land tenure recognition;
second, support from a mediator in building knowledge and negotiating land use decision-making;
and third, compatibility of the competing actors’ interests.
In view of the global struggle for sustainability, we consider it the scientific community’s
responsibility to contribute to sustainable development with its research. From this study, we learnt
that in order for sustainability science and land system science to be transformative, their proponents
should further investigate actors’ actions and agency, also in other fields than land governance, simply
because actors influence transformations. Furthermore, we believe it is promising to critically analyse
actors’ interests (meanings attributed to action) and means, as well as the distribution of means
among actors, with a special focus on social networks, power relations, sources of power, conditions
of social and environmental justice, and the institutional context influencing actors. Regarding the
study of land governance transformations in Myanmar, we see three priorities for further critical
and transformative research. First, as shown in this study, formal land tenure recognition is vital for
securing actors’ access to land; but land formalisation can also have negative social and environmental
impacts. It is therefore important to learn more about the implications of past and current land tenure
formalisation processes and potentials for formally recognizing customary land tenure systems in
Myanmar. Second, there is need for a better understanding of the social networks of near and distant
actors in land governance. Knowing how actors are connected to which other actors, comprehending
their agency in interactions, understanding what kinds of institutions influence them, and identifying
key actors in the network would facilitate the identification and targeting of leverage points for
transforming land governance towards sustainable development. In connection with the analysis
of social networks, further research could focus on power relations in Myanmar’s land governance.
Third, if land governance transformation is to be oriented towards just and sustainable development,
the transformation process itself requires further attention. Transdisciplinary approaches and concepts
such as social learning might prove useful to identify enabling and hindering factors of collective
(social) learning among current and potential key actors in land governance.
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Abbreviations
CF community forestry
CSO civil society organisation
GPS global positioning system
KNU Karen National Union
LUT land use trajectory
NGO nongovernmental organisation
NRP Nature Reserve Project
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
VFV vacant, fallow, and virgin (land)
Appendix A. Institutional Complexity in Myanmar
Land users in Myanmar are exposed to a complex conglomerate of overlapping and sometimes
conflictive laws and policies [18]. This institutional complexity and opacity adds an additional layer of
challenges for those who often neither understand nor benefit from legislation, such as smallholders or
ethnic minorities. Table A1 summarizes some of the most relevant land-related laws and policies and
their implications for land users. Some of the challenges inherent in the legal framework presented in
Table A1 are discussed further below. The three land use trajectories examined in this study need to be
understood against the backdrop of this dynamic institutional complexity.
Table A1. Main land-related laws and policies of Myanmar and their implications for land users.
Field Law or Policy Implications
Land zones
The multitude of laws
and policies since 1850
generated an array of
different land
categorisations
There are 22 different land zones (land categories defined by the
government) in Myanmar [6]. Depending on the land zone, a specific law
or policy is binding and a government department is responsible for
administering the land. Legal land use purposes are stated in the respective
laws and policies. In some land zones, dwellers can be forcibly evicted [78].
Forest
Forest Law (1992) and
Forest Policy (1995)
The law and policy define rules for governing the country’s so far
overexploited forests with a greater focus on conservation, sustainable use,
and community participation [44]. However, the law still permits logging
by specific actors to a certain degree [79].
Community Forestry
Instructions (1995,
reformulated in 2016)
Local communities can apply for community forests to fulfil basic
livelihood needs and reforest degraded forests [5,44].
Land
acquisitions
“Wasteland
Instructions” (1991) 1
These instructions encouraged large-scale export-oriented plantations on
“wasteland” [4] and provided agribusinesses with easier access it [5]. 2
Self-Sufficiency
Plan (1990s)
The cultivation of oil palms and other food and industrial crops were
strongly encouraged to reduce Myanmar’s dependency on imports [2,3].
2000–2030 Master Plan
for the Agriculture
Sector (2002)
The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation prioritised large-scale
agriculture for industrial production, especially rubber, oil palm, and other
strategic crops [2].
Rubber boosting policies
(2005/06)
In 2005, government quotas for rubber (45% of private harvest was
reserved for government) were entirely abolished [15–17].
Moreover, with China’s Opium Substitution Program in 2006, Chinese
agribusinesses received financial incentives and enjoyed eased bureaucratic
procedures in Northern Myanmar [5].
Vacant, Fallow, and
Virgin Land
Management Law (2012)
Similar to the Wasteland Instructions (see above), this law made it possible
to allocate any “vacant”, “fallow”, or “virgin” land to domestic or foreign
investors [6]. 2
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Table A1. Cont.
Field Law or Policy Implications
Land use
certificates
Farmland Law (2012)
The law created a (quasi) 3 private land use property right, providing
official land use certificates to farmers [4]. However, the Farmland Law is
not valid for “forest land” administered by the Department of Forestry,
such as Reserved Forests.
Forest Law (1992)
On some (but not all) “forest land” administered by the Department of
Forestry, any person or company can apply for a permit to implement an
economic project such as an agribusiness, but must then strictly adhere to
the exact contents of the approval [80].
Land Use Certificates of
the Karen National
Union (KNU)
Over the past few years, KNU’s Agriculture Department has measured
Karen people’s agricultural land and issued land use certificates to provide
more land tenure security to Karen people [81]. However, according to our
interview partners, so far these certificates are not recognised by the
Myanmar government.
Ethnic minority
policy
KNU Land Policy (1974,
amended in 2005
and 2014)
KNU’s land policy of 2014 aims at promoting social progress, security, and
justice in the management of land ownership. It claims to be in line with
human rights standards, prioritizing the occupation and use rights of
marginalised and vulnerable people and village communities. Moreover,
it emphasizes the social and ecological functions of land, forests, fisheries,
water, and related natural resources [81,82].
1 Full title: Duties and Rights of the Central Committee for the Management of Cultivable Land, Fallow Land and
Waste Land [4]. 2 According to Kenney-Lazar ([5], p. 6), “wastelands” were effectively defined as land without a
land title, the same as “vacant, fallow and virgin lands” [6]. 3 Under certain circumstances, the government can
rescind a land use certificate [4].
Even though the Forest Law of 1992 attempted at promoting sustainable development of
forestland, several challenges remained. Reserved Forest land is a protected class of forestland
that was primarily intended for the production of forest products, including community forestry [4].
Oberndorf [4] (p. 7) however highlighted the diverging worlds of practice in reality and theory in law:
“Many areas of Reserved Forest land in the country have been converted to agricultural production by
smallholder famers or village settlement without a change in the classification of the land. In many
areas, land classified as Reserved Forest land on existing maps does not match current use. Rural
populations that have traditionally used areas of Reserved Forest land for generations are technically
in violation of the Forest Law, though local authorities have often granted permission to use these
lands in the past”. The Forest Law allows reclassification of forestland to accommodate actual use, but
implementation is still pending [83]. Unlike Reserved Forests, Protected Public Forests are intended for
conservation purposes. The mismatch between official land use regulations and actual land use is less
prevalent in Protected Public Forests than in Reserved Forests, as they tend to be well demarcated [4].
However, the creation of a Protected Public Forest on land where communities have already established
traditional livelihoods can be problematic [4,10].
In addition to the challenges related to forestlands, most of the laws and policies highlighted
in Table A1 seem to have reduced smallholders’ land tenure security and eased land acquisitions.
Especially the “Wasteland Instructions” (1991) and the Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Land Management
Law (short VFV Law, 2012) weakened smallholders’ land tenure. Both only recognised land as already
being in use if farmers had official land use certificates, which most farmers in these land categories
lacked—and still lack; accordingly, they acquired the status of “squatters” [12]. Ferguson [84] and
Kelley-Lazar [5] argued that “wastelands” were a political land category used by the government to
gain control over land and populations especially in ethnic minority areas and areas of insurgency.
In 2012, the concept of “wastelands” was formalised in the VFV Law [4,5]. Over the past decades,
“wastelands” or “vacant, fallow, and virgin lands” were preferably awarded to state-owned economic
enterprises, joint ventures, corporations, or private individuals, regardless of the original landowner
or customary traditions and laws [4,5]. Responding to pressures from civil society at the time of
submission of this paper, the Myanmar government approved an amendment to the Vacant, Fallow,
and Virgin Land Management Law of 2012 that excludes ethnic lands under customary systems from
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the category of vacant, fallow, and virgin land. However, the exact interpretation and implementation
of this amendment is pending.
Another challenge arose from several changes in the military government’s national policies
regarding oil palm and rubber concessions in the 1990s and 2000s. The Self-Sufficiency Plan and
the 2000–2030 Master Plan for the Agriculture Sector aimed at turning Tanintharyi Region first into
a “palm oil bowl” [2] and second into an area for rubber expansion [85]. With respect to palm oil,
in the 1990s the Myanmar government needed to reduce its dependency on palm oil imports from
other Southeast Asian countries [6]. Consequently, the government decided to become self-sufficient
for palm oil, choosing the Tanintharyi Region as the most suitable region for oil palm cultivation
due to its climatic conditions. With regard to rubber, in 1989 the government’s State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) allowed rubber producers to sell 55% of their latex on the private
market—while the rest had to be sold to the government [16]. In 2005, these government quotas
were entirely abolished [16], assumedly due to the government’s intention to promote rubber as one
of Myanmar’s strategic cash crops [15]. In 2006, China and Myanmar agreed on China’s Opium
Substitution Programme, attracting many Chinese investors to northern Myanmar [2] and increasing
demand for Myanmar rubber in China. Moreover, rubber prices increased throughout the 1990s
and 2000s until 2011 [86]. Subsequently, companies with personal or business connections to the
military were awarded large-scale land concessions for oil palm cultivation [2,3]. Additionally, over
the following years the government created several financial incentives for rubber cultivation [5,15,16].
This Self-Sufficiency Plan in combination with the previously established land-acquisition-friendly legal
environment prepared the ground for a series of large-scale land acquisitions in Tanintharyi Region.
Moreover, documentation of land titles has been inconsistent and unequal over the past decades.
The Farmland Law (2012) introduced the “Form Seven” [18], the official land use certificate for
farmers of any scale. A link between the Farmland Law and VFV Law eventually also permitted
VFV lands to be reclassified as farmland [4], thus permitting VFV landholders to apply for such a
land use certificate under the Farmland Law. However, land users whose plantations were officially
located on Reserved Forest land were still not eligible to apply for “Form Seven” (source: personal
communication, respondent anonymised). Prior to 2012, nothing like “Form Seven” had existed.
Land users practised different forms of written documentation, such as tax receipts, “Form 105”
(certified map), or booklets [18], or they arranged oral agreements with witnesses. Many land
users still do not hold a “Form Seven” (due to pending applications or nonsuitability of land
zone). For average residents like smallholders, the township-level Department of Agricultural Land
Management and Statistics (DALMS)—previously called Settlement and Land Records Department
(SLRD)—normally issues the “Form Seven” based on a mandate from the Committee of the Farmland
Law (also called “Administrative Body of the Farmland Law”) (source: personal communication,
respondent anonymised).
Finally, the Karen National Union’s Land Use Policy partly conflicts with the Myanmar government’s
land-related laws and policies. While some land users in the mixed-control area might prefer to adhere
to the KNU’s policy, others might prefer to follow the Myanmar government’s legislation (source:
personal communication, respondent anonymised). Adhering to both sides’ legislations is rather
challenging due to their different nature. This conflictual overlapping of different institutions adds
another level of complexity to land governance.
It is also worth noting that until 2012 our case study area was called a “brown region”, which
was a governmental term for an area of mixed control between the Myanmar government and ethnic
organisations usually involving active fighting [87]. The KNU and the military were heavily engaged
in armed conflict until the first regional ceasefire agreement in 2012. During this time, law enforcement
was almost impossible. On the one hand, some villagers made unrestricted use of natural resources to
improve their livelihood, engaging both in legal activities and officially illegal activities like logging or
mining. On the other hand, villagers often suffered human rights violations committed by new actors
entering the area from outside, and these were never held accountable for their crimes. Depending
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on the conflict situation, government staff sometimes did not dare to visit rural areas, including to
measure cultivated land and hand out tax receipts that land users could have used to document
government recognition of their land use (source: personal communication, respondent anonymised).
Appendix B. Overview of Agency Components in the Actor (Re) Action Framework
Table A2 provides an overview of how we operationalised agency components in our study.
Table A2. Overview of the definitions of agency components in this study.
Meaning
Means (Own or Have Access to Material and Immaterial Means) 1
Natural
Means
Human
Means Physical Means
Financial
Means Social Means
Institutional
Means
Goals or interests
actors pursue with
their (re)action
Land, crops,
forest,
animals, etc.
Labour,
knowledge,
skills, etc.
Built infrastructure,
machines,
communication,
transportation, etc.
Turnover,
funding,
remittances,
credits, etc.
Social network,
relationships,
type of
interaction, etc.
Land tenure
(formal and
informal), political
status, cultural
identity, etc.
1 Means are defined according to Wiesmann, et al. [21], Bennett, et al. [43], and the sources they cite. In line with
the grounded theory approach [88], we subsume political, institutional, and cultural means—different sources use
different terms—under institutional means.
Appendix C. Overview of Main Actors and Their Agency
Table A3 summarizes the main actors involved in land use and land use decision-making across
the three land use trajectories studied.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3823 23 of 30
Table A3. Overview of the main actors and their agency across the three land use trajectories (LUTs) studied.
Actors
Meanings (Goals,
Interests)
Material and Immaterial Means (That Actors Own or Have Access to)
Natural Means Human Means Physical Means Financial Means Social Means Institutional Means
Locally involved actors before the studied LUTs evolved
Smallholders before
LUTs evolved
To have enough food
and survive the civil
war; some Karen fled to
Thai refugee camps
Land for shifting
cultivation of rice,
sesame (for oil), and
other subsistence crops,
some cattle, few cash
crops, very little
mining, full access to
forest
Help each other with
cultivation, never hire
labour, traditional
knowledge (cultivation
and other), almost no
access to other
knowledge
Road in bad condition,
only bullock carts, no
telephones, no
electricity;
road and vehicles
improved in early
2000s
Very little income
(approx. 20% of
today’s), no
remittances, no credits;
some were able to
pawn gold
Social contacts outside
nearby villages very
limited, relationship to
government officials
almost inexistent
No formal land titles
(only crop tax receipts
at most) 1; customary
practices, almost no
political representation;
Karen (Village A) and
Dawei-Burmese
(Village B) ethnicity
Locally involved actors during and after the evolution of the LUTs
Landless immigrants
and migrant workers
(LUT 1 and LUT 3)
To generate income for
their basic livelihood,
return home, and/or
buy land
Usually no land apart
from vegetable garden
(0.2 ha), limited access
to forest
Never hire labour,
learn by doing, through
instructions from peers
or supervisors
Company employees:
access to some
resources via the
company;
Casual labourers in
village: very few
physical means
Income of USD 440 to
2200 per year and
person 2; no access to
credits, but advance
payment of salary
possible; sending but
no receiving of
remittances
Access to employment
only through social
contacts (relatives and
friends) at place of origin
and destination, usually
limited to personal
network
Company employees:
some have contract,
some oral agreement;
others: oral agreement;
“outsider” status
among villagers
Military agro-industrial
company, production
branch of military
conglomerate
(LUT 1)
Operational: to
produce palm oil for
soap manufacturing
serving domestic
market and military
camps in Myanmar;
strategic: follow
objectives of
conglomerate 3
2748 ha of oil palm
plantations confirmed
in current contract,
totally 3720 ha
managed (incl. mill,
roads, waterways, etc.);
original concession
covered 12,140 ha
13 permanent service
staff, 160 plantation
labourers (migrant
workers) with contract,
25 casual labourers
(locals); managers
access cultivation
knowledge via the
government 4,
Facebook, and other
companies
Mill for raw palm oil
production (10 t per
hour), water pumps,
machine-aided tools,
electricity from 10
generators, internet via
personal smartphone,
relatively good
transportation vehicles
Annual turnover of
approx. USD 420,300,
but no profit, therefore
rather dissatisfied;
access to funds from
mother company, no
need for access to
credits
Top management closely
connected to national
and regional military
elite and other influential
national and regional
actors
At first concession
permit from central
Department of Forestry,
since 2011 30-year land
lease contract;
proximity to military,
with military forces’
reputation among
Karen people of being
intimidating and
violent
Nature Reserve Project
(NRP)
(semi-governmental
organisation)
(LUT 2)
To conserve
biodiversity and
protect endangered
species in collaboration
with local communities
The Nature Reserve
encompasses approx.
170,000 ha of forest
(ranging from primary
forest to heavily
degraded forest and
villages with their
cropland)
Approx. 80 staff, of
which 50% local project
staff, 50% government
staff; access to most
types of knowledge
when needed, receive
technical support when
needed
Good transportation
vehicles, full
communication
equipment (incl.
computer and internet),
electricity at
headquarters, access to
generators for some
local offices
International funding:
USD 450,000 annually
from three
international oil and
gas companies 5
Close collaboration with
departments of forestry
at all levels, some
collaboration with
international NGOs,
researchers, KNU, and
local population, support
from oil and gas
companies
Land officially
designated “Protected
Public Forest” (under
1992 Forest Law),
formal mandate from
central Department of
Forestry to implement
the Nature Reserve
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Table A3. Cont.
Actors
Meanings (Goals,
Interests)
Material and Immaterial Means (That Actors Own or Have Access to)
Natural Means Human Means Physical Means Financial Means Social Means Institutional Means
After 2015:
International NGO
(LUT 2)
To empower local
people for sustainable
forest landscapes in the
Asia-Pacific region
(under REDD+
programme)
Does not use forest; has
facilitated 94
Community Forestry
(CF) permissions
covering a total of
20,234 ha in Myanmar
(Jan 2018)
Myanmar office: 13
permanent, seven
volunteer staff;
Tanintharyi office:
three staff; access to
most types of
knowledge when
needed, skills of
employees improved
Good transportation
vehicles, full
communication
equipment (incl.
computer and internet),
electricity
International funding:
USD 85,000 annually
for the national CF
programme; approx.
USD 970,000 annually
for all programmes
Close collaboration with
departments of forestry
at all levels, with other
national and
international NGOs, civil
society organisations
(CSOs), researchers, and
local population
Nationally registered
international NGO,
viewed by local
population as
professional supporter
After 2016:
Village B
CF group
(LUT 2)
To maintain and use
natural resources over
the long term
57 ha of community
forest in the Nature
Reserve buffer zone
25 member households;
access to information
and capacity
development via the
NGO
No physical
infrastructure apart
from personal
resources, access to CF
is difficult (no good
paths)
USD 1390 seed money
from NGO
Close collaboration with
NGO; in exchange with
Department of Forestry,
NRP, and other CF
groups in the region,
elsewhere in Myanmar,
and abroad (via NGO)
30-year CF certificate
from district
Department of Forestry;
internal constitution
(board, members,
procedures etc.)
Smallholders today
(LUT 3)
To generate income for
their basic livelihood
and children’s
education
Land for mostly cash
crops only, some mixed
cropping, approx. 50%
less land accessible
today than before, on
average 7.4 ha (2–15 ha)
6, very limited access to
forest
Some hire few
labourers 2–3 times a
year, some do not;
cultivation knowledge
from parents, peers,
some training; access to
market price (via
traders); some training
from CSOs and NGOs
Roads are reasonable,
access to motorbikes
and cars; telephones,
but usually no use of
internet; limited
electricity from
generators or solar
panels
Annual household
turnover (not profit)
approx. USD 1400 from
cash crops and casual
labour 7, some access
to informal credits with
high interest rates,
some people receive
remittances
Contacts mostly through
personal network, some
loose contacts to
government officials,
CSOs and NGOs, traders,
middle(wo)men,
entrepreneurs, etc.
Village A: no change in
land title situation;
Village B: change in
2013 from weak land
use recognition (crop
tax receipts) to “Form
Seven” land use
certificate from
township government;
in both villages:
increased political
representation (incl.
CSOs)
Regional entrepreneurs
(do not live in the
villages but use land
there)
(LUT 3)
To generate income
and keep their land in
order to maintain their
established livelihood
and offer their children
a good future
Rubber plantations in
different locations,
small to medium scale
(8–120 ha), some fallow
land
Usually do not work
on the plantations, hire
permanent and/or
casual labour; access to
relevant knowledge (in
Myanmar language),
satisfactory (but not
excellent) own and
employee skills
Most have a car and
motorbikes, and
machines to aid
cultivation; some have
a water pump, internet
via smartphone, and
electricity at their
headquarters
Annual turnover from
rubber approx. USD
18,800 (USD
2600–44,300), unclear
whether profitable or
deficient; some have
additional sources of
income, all have access
to credits
Well-connected among
regional elite and traders,
access to government
officials, usually
members of
business-oriented rubber
association, rather good
relationship with local
population
“Form Seven” from
township government
for all sites around
Village B, but none
around village A
(Reserved Forest land);
viewed by local
population as
innovators
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3823 25 of 30
Table A3. Cont.
Actors
Meanings (Goals,
Interests)
Material and Immaterial Means (That Actors Own or Have Access to)
Natural Means Human Means Physical Means Financial Means Social Means Institutional Means
Agribusiness (private
company)
(LUT 3)
Short-term: to generate
income and improve
produce quality;
long-term: regional
social and economic
development
Owns over 400 ha,
cultivates 384 ha (oil
palm, rubber, areca
palm, and others);
started with 105 ha,
continuously
expanded; would
prefer to cultivate more
land to improve
returns to scale
22 permanent staff,
48 seasonal or
temporary staff; mostly
migrant workers, some
locals; access to
relevant knowledge (in
Myanmar language),
satisfactory (but not
excellent) own and
employee skills
Small mill for raw palm
oil production (3 t per
5 h), rubber processing
(for air-dried sheets),
machine-aided tools,
water pumps,
electricity from two
generators, internet via
personal smartphone,
relatively good
transportation vehicles
Annual turnover
approx. USD 119,900;
apparently not
profitable, therefore
dissatisfied; company
owners have additional
sources of income; no
credits needed
Owners closely
connected to regional
elite and traders, high
position in regional
rubber association,
politically active, good
access to government,
good relationship with
local population
30-year land lease
permit from regional
government from the
outset (applied in 1998,
received in 2000); later
additional land under
“Form Seven”; viewed
by local population as
innovator and
agribusiness expert
1 However, crop tax receipts did not include shifting cultivation fallows, and farmers did not always register all cultivated plots because they could not afford to pay the taxes. 2 Household
income depends on several factors, including (1) gender (women earn less); (2) how many people per household can work (including teenagers); (3) type of employment (permanent,
seasonal, or casual); (4) position (supervisors earn more than other employees); (5) skills (special skills, like rubber harvesting, milling etc. are better paid); (6) other economic activities
(e.g., selling of betel leaves, rubber saplings, etc. in spare time); and others; 3 The overall conglomerate’s goals are (1) to guarantee the welfare of current and retired military servants and
their families; (2) to create job opportunities for local people; and (3) to support regional development. 4 Usually via the Perennial Crops Division or the Perennial Crops Research and
Development Centre (PCRDC) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation (MoALI). 5 More than three oil and gas companies run activities in the case study area; we count
only those who effectively contribute to NRP. 6 We defined the maximum area farmed by smallholders to be 15 ha—rather than the internationally widespread 2 ha—because most
smallholders in the two villages cultivated between 2 and 15 ha of land. We also encountered a small number of wealthier local medium-scale farmers, who cultivated 20–83 ha, as well as
local entrepreneurs with a diverse portfolio of activities and diverse sources of income. However, as these two groups were not perceived as main actors by the focus group participants,
we did not include them as actor categories in this study. 7 Annual turnovers reported ranged between USD 110 and USD 4150. Most smallholders nowadays also do casual labour for
other plantation owners in order to increase their income.
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Appendix D. The Nature Reserve and Karen Villages
As elaborated in Section 3.1.2, the Nature Reserve was established thanks to an environmental
compensation for the pipelines to Bangkok crossing the so-called Myanmar Southern Forest Complex.
Three international oil and gas companies provided funding for the Nature Reserve Project (NRP),
a central-level semi-governmental organisation at the Department of Forestry, tasked with establishing
and maintaining the Nature Reserve. Besides this environmental compensation, the international
oil and gas companies also support Karen and non-Karen village development through corporate
social responsibility programmes (in the area near the companies’ compounds) such as infrastructure
development, school construction, provision of medical teams, agricultural trainings, micro-finance
programmes etc., which is greatly appreciated by the local villagers. For constructing the pipelines,
most smallholders received financial compensation from the companies for the land they lost to the
pipelines. However, one company has been accused of substantial human rights violations in Karen
villages in connection with construction of the pipelines in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The KNU did not approve the settling of the oil and gas companies and the construction of the
pipelines crossing the area for which the KNU claimed administrative authority. The Nature Reserve
encompasses an area with predominantly Karen villages inside the reserve. NRP and KNU collaborate
to a maximum degree to maintain peace. There are some diverging opinions between the two actors,
however usually conflicts do not escalate. The Nature Reserve regulations (from being designated as
Protected Public Forest under the Forest Law 1992) make the existence of villages and their land and
forest use formally illegal. Several Karen villages inside the Nature Reserve do not approve the reserve
and continue to practise their traditional, customary shifting cultivation and forest use. Moreover, the
villagers argue that they do not need the Nature Reserve’s regulations because their use of the forest is
already sustainable. They call for community-based management of their natural environment instead
of top-down implementation of Protected Public Forest.
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